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Introduction
PEACE OFFICERS SHOOTING or otherwise using fatal force on
criminal suspects in their custody has become an enormously charged
issue in recent years, with ripple effects throughout society. From
events in Ferguson, Missouri1 and Staten Island, New York2 in 2014, to
tragic incidents in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Falcon Heights, Min-
nesota in 2016,3 these deaths of unarmed men in encounters with our
armed guardians of public safety have spawned ever-widening cycles of
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1. See infra Section I.B.
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See generally Matt Furber & Richard Perez-Pena, After Philando’s Castile’s Killing,
Obama Calls Police Shooting ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html https://perma.
cc/6K9N-HUVP].
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major unrest: social movements, public protests, riots, and—equally
sad—lone-wolf assassinations of unsuspecting peace officers.4
On the primarily legal stage, how the criminal justice systems
throughout our nation have dealt with these custodial deaths—and
particularly the use of local grand juries by county prosecutors—has
itself created political controversy and enflamed further social upset.
Two states, New York and California, have responded in quite con-
trasting manners: New York instituted a rule for initial independent
review of such cases by the state’s Attorney General before local prose-
cutors can act,5 and California’s Legislature enacted a ban on both
local and state prosecutors from taking such cases to their grand juries
entirely.6
This article will first discuss the recent historical antecedents of
peace officer fatal force encounters, with selected examples from
around the nation involving local grand juries. Next, we briefly ex-
amine the New York response and an example of local prosecutor
backlash to primary supervision by the state. Then, in more detail be-
cause of the drastic nature of the solution, we delve into the legislative
history of California’s Senate Bill 227 (“SB 227”) of 2015 which en-
acted Penal Code section 917(b) as of January 1, 2016, to remove such
cases completely from grand jury indictment jurisdiction. In this dis-
cussion, we suggest that such a legislative response is not only unwise
(creating ethical issues as well) and unlikely to produce the desired
result sought by the Legislature,7 but also, ultimately, unconstitutional.
In the final section, we detail not only the many-pronged legal argu-
ments against constitutionality,8 but also carefully note a currently-
pending appellate challenge to California’s new law that we have been
involved in, one since days after the law’s passage.9
4. Id. The incidents in Baton Rouge and Falcon Heights, occurring just days apart in
July 2016, are not discussed in this article, but serve to show that peace officer fatal force
incidents continue, apparently unabated. The Washington Post is maintaining a database
on all such cases in the country since 2015, organizing the deceased by gender, race, and
other pertinent data that sheds light on the crisis through a detailed look at the numbers.
See also 990 People Shot by Police in 2015, WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washing
tonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ (last visited Nov. 2016) [https://
perma.cc/N5HD-L94A].
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra Section II.B.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. For a discussion of the January 10, 2017 published opinion issued by the Third
District Court of Appeal, finding SB 227 unconscionable, see infra Section VI.
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I. Recent Events
A. Eric Garner–Staten Island, New York
On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner was in the Tompkinsville section of
Staten Island, New York, allegedly selling untaxed cigarettes near the
Staten Island Ferry Terminal, an act for which he had been previously
arrested several times.10 After being questioned by the officers, Garner
said he did nothing wrong and asked to be left alone.11 The entirety
of the incident was captured on cellphone video. In an attempt to
arrest him, one officer reached around Garner’s neck and placed him
in a chokehold.12 The officers then wrestled him to the ground: Of-
ficer Daniel Pantaleo held his head to the ground while Officer Justin
D’Amico handcuffed him.13 Throughout the encounter, Garner re-
peated, “I can’t breathe” to the officers.14 Garner died later that day at
a local hospital.15
The New York medical examiner ruled the manner of Garner’s
death a homicide.16 The cause of death was a combination of the
chokehold that resulted in neck and chest compressions, Garner’s
pre-existing medical conditions including being overweight, and hav-
ing chronic asthma and cardiovascular disease.17
The Staten Island District Attorney’s Office brought charges
against Officer Pantaleo to a state grand jury in early September
2014.18 The grand jury heard from the officers involved and twenty-
two civilian witnesses, which included findings from emergency re-
10. James Queally & Alana Semuels, Eric Garner’s Death in NYPD Chokehold Case Ruled A
Homicide, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
garner-homicide-20140801-story.html [https://perma.cc/DT2Q-G499].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also, Al Baker, J. David Goodman, & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the
Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https:
//perma.cc/JR3H-YPXQ].
14. Queally & Semuels, supra note 10.
15. Baker, Goodman, & Mueller, supra note 13.
16. Queally & Semuels, supra note 10.
17. James Queally & Alana Semuels, Eric Garner’s Death in NYPD Chokehold Case Ruled A
Homicide, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
garner-homicide-20140801-story.html [https://perma.cc/CLK8-SY9M].
18. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict in Eric
Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/
nyregion /grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-gar
ner.html [https://perma.cc/E7JW-2GUA].
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sponders at the scene, experts of forensic pathology, and experts in
police procedure and training.19
On, December 3, 2014, after less than a day of deliberation, the
Staten Island grand jury decided not to indict Officer Pantaleo.20 The
District Attorney’s Office petitioned the court to publicly release spe-
cific information about the results of the grand jury investigation,
other than the testimony and exhibits shown.21
Then, on March 19, 2015, a court ruled against publicly releasing
the grand jury minutes from its investigation, citing that the party re-
questing the release, the New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”),
did not establish its burden of “compelling and particularized
need.”22 The NYCLU argued that the public needed to reconcile the
grand jury’s decision with what it observed in the widely publicized
cellphone footage, and the possibility of effecting change in legisla-
tion (yet the NYCLU did not provide any specific legislative action).23
The court ruled that the NYCLU’s argument was purely speculative,
and that the security of the witnesses and the jurors was imperative.24
As state supreme court Justice William Garnett wrote, “It is in such
notorious cases that witnesses’ cooperation and honesty should be en-
couraged—not discouraged—for fear of disclosure.”25
The NYCLU appealed the lower court’s ruling and, on July 29,
2015, the state supreme court appellate division panel affirmed.26 The
justices were concerned with why the NYCLU wanted to focus on just
this particular grand jury, instead of the system as a whole, if its goal
was to improve the perception of fairness within all grand juries.27
A federal investigation is ongoing, and a federal grand jury inves-
tigation began on February 10, 2016 into whether Garner’s civil rights
were violated when Officer Pantaleo used force to restrain him.28 As
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also Judge Makes Decision on Secret Testimony in Garner Case, CBS NEWS (Mar.
19, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eric-garner-grand-jury-testimony-new-york-
judge/ [https://perma.cc/H7XQ-77RZ].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Appeals Court: Grand Jury records in Eric Garner case stay sealed, CBS NEWS (July 29,
2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/appeals-court-grand-jury-records-in-eric-
garner-case-stay-sealed/ [https://perma.cc/ADY2-GNU4].
27. Id.
28. John Marzulli, Justice Department presents evidence to grand jury in police choking death
of Eric Garner to determine if Staten Island man’s civil rights were violated, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb.
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of January 20, 2017, the end of the Justice Department under the
Obama administration,29 there has been no agreement as to whether
to file civil charges.30
B. Michael Brown–Ferguson, Missouri
Just before noon on August 9, 2014, Michael Brown shoved aside
a convenience store clerk to steal a handful of cigarillo packs and left
the store with one of his friends.31 Police dispatch radioed “stealing in
progress” for officers in the area to respond.32 Officer Darren Wilson
was nearby in his patrol vehicle when he came upon two young men
walking in the middle of the street who matched the description of
the suspects, one of whom was holding a handful of cigarillo packs.33
Officer Wilson drove up beside the two men and told them to move to
the sidewalk.34 He then called for backup and pulled his vehicle in
front of the men, blocking the street ahead.35 Upon attempting to exit
his vehicle, Officer Wilson opened the door and it is unclear whether
the door rebounded off of Brown or Brown pushed it shut again.36
Brown then reached his arm into the patrol vehicle, and grabbed and
punched Officer Wilson in the face and neck.37 Still seated in the ve-
hicle, Wilson responded by going for his firearm, and Brown went for
it as well.38
Brown pushed the firearm against Officer Wilson’s hip but Wil-
son managed to point it at Brown’s hand, at which point, Wilson fired,
striking Brown in the thumb and just missing Wilson’s own lap.39
4, 2016, 10:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/feds-case-cops-involved-
eric-garner-death-article-1.2527515 [https://perma.cc/K3NQ-RM5P].
29. Dean Meminger, Time Running out for Obama DOJ to Pursue Civil Rights Case in
Death of Eric Garner, NY1 (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:25 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/
criminal-justice/2017/01/9/time-running-out-for-obama-doj-to-pursue-civil-rights-case-in-
death-of-eric-garner.html [https://perma.cc/3EFS-TGE7].
30. Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, Feds at Odds Over Charges in Eric Garner Case,
CNN (June 2, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/02/politics/feds-eric-gar
ner-charges-odds/ [https://perma.cc/S46B-K27D].
31. U.S. Department of Justice, US Department of Justice report regarding the criminal inves-
tigation into the shooting death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri, Police Officer Darren Wilson
6, (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Brown turned and ran down the street.40 Officer Wilson got out of his
vehicle and ran after Brown.41 At about 180 feet down the street from
the patrol vehicle, Brown stopped, turned, and came toward Officer
Wilson with his hands at his sides.42 Officer Wilson repeatedly ordered
him to stop, yet Brown kept advancing.43 Wilson shot Brown multiple
times until Brown fell to the ground.44
In three separate torrents of fire including the one in the vehicle,
Officer Wilson’s shots met their mark six to eight times, the last find-
ing Brown’s head; Brown died in the street.45
In the aftermath of the shooting, concerned citizens marched in
the streets, and on November 24, 2014, they returned to the streets—
some violently—upon hearing the news that the grand jury, com-
posed of nine white and three black jurors, did not indict Officer Wil-
son.46 The District Attorney’s office subsequently released all the
grand jury materials to the public, which included all witness testimo-
nies, audio, photos, and video transcripts.47
The U.S. Department of Justice completed a thorough eighty-six-
page investigation into the shooting (including grand jury testimony,
DNA/ballistics/fingerprint forensics, toxicology, and store video).
This independent federal report concluded, “this matter lacks
prosecutive merit and should be closed.”48
C. Tamir Rice–Cleveland, Ohio
“I’m sitting in the park . . . [t]here’s a guy here with a pistol
pointing it at everybody . . . . The guy keeps pulling it in and out of his
pants, it’s probably fake but you know what, he’s scaring the shit out
40. Id.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id. at 7–8.
43. Id. at 7, 13; Eyder Peralta & Krishnadev Calamur, Ferguson Documents: How The
Grand Jury Reached A Decision, NPR (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2014/11/25/366507379/ferguson-docs-how-the-grand-jury-reached-a-decision [https:
//perma.cc/H5DR-F2W6].
44. DOJ, supra note 31, at 7.
45. DOJ, supra note 31, at 7.
46. Eyder Peralta & Bill Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No Charges For Officer In Michael
Brown’s Death, NPR (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/
24/366370100/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-michael-brown-case [https://perma.cc/6
NTW-TDB6]. It should be noted that Eric Garner’s arrest in New York occurred just over
three weeks earlier than Michael Brown’s in Missouri, but the grand jury looking into
Brown’s death declined to indict first, by a mere nine days, before the grand jury declina-
tion in New York.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. DOJ, supra note 31, at 86.
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of people,” a 911 caller reported to Cleveland police on November 22,
2014.49 The “guy” playing with the pistol was twelve-year-old Tamir
Rice.50 The pistol was an airsoft pellet gun that did not have an orange
safety marker to show it was a fake firearm.51 Rookie officer Timothy
Loehmann and his training officer Frank Garmack headed to the
scene after receiving the dispatch call, which omitted the information
that the pistol was “probably fake.”52
Officers Loehmann and Garmack drove their patrol car through
the park’s grass and right up to the gazebo where Rice was sitting
alone.53 Upon reaching the gazebo, Officer Loehmann yelled out
from the car window three times for Rice to put his hands up.54 Rice
moved the pellet gun at his waist.55 Officer Loehmann jumped out of
the car and, two seconds later, shot Rice.56 Rice died the next day
from the gunshot wounds.57
On December 28, 2015, after completing its investigation, a
grand jury declined to indict either officer with charges relating to
Rice’s death.58 Prosecutor Tim McGinty said, “Given this perfect
storm of human error, mistakes and communications by all involved
that day, the evidence did not indicate criminal conduct by police.”59
D. Walter Scott–Charleston, South Carolina
A routine traffic stop turned deadly, as Walter Scott was pulled
over near a vacant lot in North Charleston, South Carolina on April 4,
2015, for a broken brake light.60 Officer Michael Slager got out of his
49. Tom McCarthy, Tamir Rice: video shows boy, 12, shot ‘seconds’ after police confronted
child, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/
26/tamir-rice-video-shows-boy-shot-police-cleveland [https://perma.cc/AR9J-2ANU].
50. Id.
51. Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video shows Cleveland officer shooting 12-year-old Tamir
Rice within seconds, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-
of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/ [https://perma.cc/37S4-VS2S].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. McCarthy, supra note 49.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Ashley Fantz, Steve Almasy, & Catherine E. Shoichet, Tamir Rice shooting: No charges
for officers, CNN (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shoot
ing/ [https://perma.cc/PE46-7CBW].
59. Id.
60. Daniella Silva, Walter Scott Shooting: Dash Cam Video From Traffic Stop Is Released,
NBC (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/walter-scott-shooting/dash-cam-
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patrol car, walked up to Scott’s driver’s side window, and asked for
Scott’s license, insurance, and registration.61 When Scott did not have
the needed information, Officer Slager went back to his patrol car for
a moment.62 In the dash cam video, Scott is seen jumping out of the
car and running away from the scene.63 At that point, Officer Slager
pursued Scott into the vacant lot.64 A bystander in the adjacent lot
caught the events that followed on cellphone video.65 While the
cellphone owner cursed in the background, the video captured Scott
running through the park, a short physical exchange between Scott
and Officer Slager where something fell to the ground (possibly
Slager’s taser) and Scott turned to run again.66 As Scott ran away, the
video showed Officer Slager drawing his firearm and firing eight
shots, four or five of which hit Scott, killing him in minutes.67 The
video then showed Officer Slager retrieve whatever had fallen on the
ground and drop it next to Scott’s body, and later picking it up and
placing it back in his belt.68 In his initial comments regarding the al-
tercation, Officer Slager claimed that Scott had taken his taser.69
Upon release of the cellphone video, Officer Slager was arrested
for murder.70 On June 8, 2015, after completing its investigation, a
grand jury returned a murder indictment against Officer Slager for
killing Walter Scott.71
video-shows-walter-scott-fleeing-fatal-shooting-michael-n338786 [https://perma.cc/W6YW-
QJ6W].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Erik Ortiz, Michael Slager Charged With Murder of Walter Scott in South Carolina, NBC
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/walter-scott-shooting/michael-slager-
south-carolina-officer-charged-murder-black-man-n337526 [https://perma.cc/3LRU-9P
5E].
68. Silva, supra note 60.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Erin McClam, Walter Scott Shooting: Grand Jury Returns Murder Indictment Against
Cop, NBC (June 8, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/walter-scott-shooting/walter
-scott-shooting-grand-jury-returns-murder-indictment-against-cop-n371626 [https://perma.
cc/HW9A-J7XA]. In December, 2016, a trial jury hung on the case (but there will be a
retrial in the future). See Alan Blinder, Mistrial for South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter Scott,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-scott-michael
-slager-north-charleston.html [https://perma.cc/JV5U-UUWF].
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E. Freddie Gray–Baltimore, Maryland
The events leading up to the death of Freddie Gray are highly
disputed and are currently being examined in court.72 On April 12,
2015, Gray was chatting with a friend in a west Baltimore neighbor-
hood known for drug dealing when he spotted bicycle police, and
thereafter fled.73 There was a short chase by two bicycle officers and a
third officer on foot.74 Less than three minutes later, the officers ap-
prehended Gray and arrested him for possessing an illegal switch-
blade knife.75 The officers then requested a transport van to take Gray
to where he would be booked.76 At that point, Gray requested an in-
haler for his asthma but was not given one until much later.77 Then,
the officers placed him in the van with handcuffs on.78 About four
minutes later, the officers stopped the van because Gray was acting
“irate.”79 There, his metal handcuffs were replaced with plastic ones
and he was also put in leg shackles; he was placed back in the van but
the officers did not secure him in a seat belt.80
Before transporting Gray to booking, the officers were called to
pick up another arrestee near where the initial chase began.81 This
person was placed in a separated holding area in the van and had no
contact with Gray.82 About forty minutes after the initial chase began,
the officers arrived at the police station; upon removing Gray from
the van, the officers found him non-responsive and not breathing.83
Paramedics responded and treated Gray at the station for about
twenty minutes and then he was taken to Maryland Shock Trauma
Center where he went into a coma and then died on April 19, 2015.84
72. Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Freddie Gray case: Officer Miller takes stand in Nero trial,
state rests, BALTIMORE SUN (May 16, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-nero-trial-day3-20160516-story.html [https://perma.cc/6XYR-BC
2M].
73. Kevin Rector, The 45-minute mystery of Freddie Gray’s death, THE BALTIMORE SUN
(Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-gray-
ticker-20150425-story.html [https://perma.cc/7VNK-6P48].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Fenton & Rector, supra note 72 (describing that Gray was placed in
plastic handcuffs).
81. Rector, supra note 73.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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The medical examiner’s report concluded that Gray suffered a partial
fracture of his cervical spinal cord and no other injuries or broken
limbs.85
Six police officers were suspended as a result of the incident:
Brian Rice, Alicia White, William Porter, Garrett Miller, Edward Nero,
and Caesar Goodson Jr.86 On May 21, 2015, a Baltimore grand jury
indicted all six officers.87 The indicted charges ranged from assault to
homicide.88 The driver of the van, Officer Goodson, was indicted with
a second-degree murder charge.89 Officers Goodson, Porter, Rice,
and White were indicted on manslaughter charges.90 All six officers
were indicted on second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and
misconduct in office charges.91 Additionally, the U.S. Department of
Justice opened a civil rights investigation into the entire Baltimore Po-
lice Department.92
In December 2015, Officer Porter’s first trial resulted in a hung
jury.93 Officer Edward Nero was then tried for his participation in the
arrest; the prosecutor contended that Nero put Gray at risk when he
placed him in the arrest van without a seat belt.94 After three trials and
three acquittals for officers who had custody of Freddy Gray when he
was injured, Baltimore State Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, dropped all
charges for the remaining three officers involved.95 In her statement
regarding her decision on July 27, 2016, she explained, “We could try
this case 100 times, and cases just like it, and we would still end up
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Richard Perez-Pena, Six Baltimore Officers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES
(May 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/us/six-baltimore-officers-indicted-
in-death-of-freddie-gray.html (emphasis added) [https://perma.cc/K3J5-5XMG].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Mistrial declared in trial of Officer William Porter in
death of Freddie Gray, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trial-jury-wednesday-20151216-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8MS7-TE3F].
94. Fenton & Rector, supra note 72.
95. Carolyn Sung & Catherine E. Shoichet, Freddie Gray case: Charges dropped against
remaining officers, CNN (June 27, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/us/freddie-
gray-verdict-baltimore-officers/ [https://perma.cc/DQ8N-L53B]; Guerin Hays, Leland Vit-
tert, & The Associated Press, All charges dropped in Freddie Gray case; no convictions, FOX NEWS
(July 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/07/27/all-charges-dropped-in-freddie-
gray-case-no-convictions.html [https://perma.cc/F4RQ-43AF].
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with the same result . . . [the case showed] an inherent bias that is a
direct result of when police police themselves.”96
F. Mario Woods–San Francisco, California
A stab victim reached the San Francisco General Hospital on De-
cember 2, 2015 to report that he was attacked at Third Street and Le
Conte, and that the suspect was still at large.97 Six blocks away, police
officers found a man who matched the suspect’s description, Mario
Woods.98 Woods was still armed with a knife, possibly the same one
used in the stabbing.99
Police officers ordered Woods to drop the knife; they used pep-
per-spray and high velocity beanbag ammunition to attempt his sub-
mission, but he refused to surrender.100 Leaning up against a wall,
Woods moved toward an officer, which caused five officers to fire their
weapons.101 Woods was shot fifteen times.102 By the time the shooting
occurred, there were at least ten police officers at the scene.103 Multi-
ple cellphone videos captured the incident and were subsequently
posted online.104
Mario Woods was a reported gang member in the Oakdale Mob
who participated in armed robbery and automobile theft, caused a car
accident while fleeing from police by vehicle, and had been convicted
of possession of a firearm by a felon.105 He had been in and out of
incarceration for much of his life.106 The toxicology report showed
that, at the time of his death, Woods had methamphetamine, mari-
juana, cough medicine, and antidepressants in his system.107
In February 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice began an inves-
tigation into the possible use of excessive force by police during this
96. Sung & Shoichet, supra note 95.
97. Chris Roberts & Julia Carrie Wong, UPDATED: Mario Woods, Gang Member Slain by
SFPD, Remembered as “Total Sweetheart”, SF WEEKLY (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.sfweekly.
com/thesnitch/2015/12/03/man-shot-by-sfpd-idd-as-mario-woods-was-on-gang-injunction
[https://perma.cc/4DZT-HGCX].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Vivian Ho & Demian Bulwa, S.F. city attorney: Police lawfully killed Mario Woods,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/San-
Francisco-city-attorney-Police-lawfully-6827312.php [https://perma.cc/GTQ4-THX6].
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incident.108 Loretta Lynch, the Attorney General, explained they
would be examining the police department’s “current operational
policies, training practices, and accountability systems” to identify ar-
eas of improvement.109 The officers involved in the shooting were
placed on administrative duty pending the outcome of the federal and
San Francisco Police Department Internal Affairs investigations.110
The San Francisco City Attorney’s office also conducted an inves-
tigation in response to a lawsuit from Woods’ family.111 On February
13, 2016, that office released a statement saying that because Woods
refused to drop the knife, he posed an imminent threat to bystanders
and officers.112 By repeatedly refusing to disarm himself and then at-
tempting to flee toward an officer and a group of onlookers, the of-
ficers’ escalation from pepper spray to beanbag ammunition to actual
ammunition was deemed justified.113 That police fatal force incident
ultimately became one of the key reasons the San Francisco mayor
demanded, and subsequently received, the resignation of Chief of Po-
lice Greg Suhr on May 19, 2016.114
II. A Tale of Two States’ Responses
A. The New York Governor Tells the Attorney General to
Investigate First
Less than a week after the Staten Island grand jury failed to indict
in the Eric Garner case, New York State Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman asked New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to immedi-
ately grant his office the power to investigate and prosecute killings of
unarmed civilians by law enforcement officials.115 His proposal re-
108. AFP & Jessica Chia, Justice Department reviewing San Francisco police’s use of excessive
force after black man was killed in a hail of police bullets, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3427311/US-Justice-Department-investigate-San-Francisco-
police.html [https://perma.cc/2YLY-PNW2].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Ho & Bulwa, supra note 107.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Emily Green, Bob Egelko, Jenna Lyons, & Erin Allday, SFPD Chief Greg Suhr resigns
after police killing of woman, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 19, 2016), http://www.sfgate.
com/bayarea/article/Police-Chief-Greg-Suhr-resigns-after-killing-of-7758122.php [https://
perma.cc/Y336-UQX5].
115. Jesse McKinley & J. David Goodman, New York Attorney General Seeks Powers to Inves-
tigate Killings by the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/
09/nyregion/new-york-attorney-general-seeks-powers-to-investigate-killings-by-the-police.
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/C8B5-7YPJ].
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ceived swift pushback from both police unions and several local dis-
trict attorneys in New York City.116 Governor Cuomo then announced
in July 2015, nearly a year after Garner’s death, that he would issue an
executive order naming the state attorney general as a special prose-
cutor for police-related civilian deaths: “A criminal justice system
doesn’t work without trust,” noted Governor Cuomo, “We will be the
first state in the country to acknowledge the problem and say we’re
going to create an independent prosecutor who does not have that
kind of connection with the organized police departments.”117 Execu-
tive Order 147 was issued July 8, 2015, and provided in part:
“. . . WHEREAS, there have been recent incidents involving the
deaths of unarmed civilians that have challenged the public’s con-
fidence and trust in our system of criminal justice; and
WHEREAS, public concerns have been raised that such incidents
cannot be prosecuted at the local level without conflict or bias, or
the public perception of conflict or bias; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to ensure that a full, reasoned, and inde-
pendent investigation and prosecution of any such incident is con-
ducted without conflict or bias, or the perception of conflict or
bias; and
WHEREAS, the foregoing compels me to conclude that my consti-
tutional obligations provide that in cases where an issue of a real or
perceived conflict of interest exists, and to ensure full confidence
in our system of criminal justice, a special prosecutor should be
appointed with respect to such incidents. Such appointment of a
special prosecutor will supersede in all ways the authority and juris-
diction of a county district attorney to manage, interpret, prose-
cute or inquire about such incidents; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, ANDREW M. CUOMO, Governor of the
State of New York, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and Laws of the State of New York, and particularly by
subdivision 2 of section 63 of the Executive Law, hereby require
the Attorney General (hereinafter, the “special prosecutor”) to in-
vestigate, and if warranted, prosecute certain matters involving the
death of an unarmed civilian, whether in custody or not, caused by
a law enforcement officer, as listed in subdivision 34 of section 1.20
of the Criminal Procedure Law. The special prosecutor may also
investigate and prosecute in such instances where, in his opinion,
there is a significant question as to whether the civilian was armed
and dangerous at the time of his or her death;
116. Id.
117. Noah Remnick, Cuomo to Appoint Special Prosecutor for Killings by Police, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/nyregion/cuomo-to-appoint-special-
prosecutor-for-killings-by-police.html [https://perma.cc/92F9-MSML].
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FURTHER, for any matter covered herein, the special prosecutor
shall have the powers and duties specified in subdivisions 2 and 8
of section 63 of the Executive Law for purposes of this Order, and
shall possess and exercise all the prosecutorial powers necessary to
investigate, and if warranted, prosecute the incident. The special
prosecutor’s jurisdiction will displace and supersede the jurisdic-
tion of the county district attorney where the incident occurred;
and such county district attorney shall have only the powers and
duties designated to him or her by the special prosecutor as speci-
fied in subdivision 2 of section 63 of the Executive Law. . . .”118
Attorney General Schneiderman then began to utilize the order,
but not without some local defiance. When the District Attorney of
upstate Rensselaer County ignored the order in an April 2016 police
shooting and took the case to a grand jury within a week (who de-
clined to indict), Schneiderman asserted himself by suing the local
prosecutor, asking a court to remove him from the case, and claiming
the grand jury was invalid for lack of local jurisdiction under the exec-
utive order giving the Attorney General first review (which it had in
fact been reviewing).119
B. The California Response
In California, the state’s then-chief law enforcement officer, At-
torney General Kamala D. Harris, saw the situation differently. She
noted in a December 22, 2014 interview with the San Francisco
Chronicle that the California state system has built-in safeguards: lo-
cally elected prosecutors are accountable to their communities and
the state attorney general has power to take over any case involving a
conflict of interest or local prosecutor not following the law.120
“I don’t think it would be good public policy to take the discretion
from elected district attorneys,” Harris noted (herself a former Dis-
trict Attorney in San Francisco); “I don’t think there’s an inherent
conflict. . . . Where there are abuses, we have designed the system
to address them. . . . [I]f I decided that there was a case where
there was a local prosecutor who was breaking the law, who was
118. Governor Cuomo Signs Executive Order Appointing NYS Attorney General as Special Prose-
cutor in Cases Where Law Enforcement Officers Are Involved in Deaths of Civilians, N.Y. STATE
(July 8, 2015), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-executive-order-
appointing-nys-attorney-general-special-prosecutor-cases [https://perma.cc/8U3P-3LNA].
119. Editorial Bd., Upstate New York’s Defiant District Attorney, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016),
http://nytimes.com/2016/05/03/opinion/upstate-new-yorks-defiant-district-attorney.
html [https://perma.cc/BQW3-6G7S].
120. Bob Egelko, Kamala Harris sees safeguards in D.A.s prosecuting police killings, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Kamala-Har
ris-sees-safeguards-in-D-A-s-5972586.php [https://perma.cc/Y4Q8-FQRL].
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committing prosecutorial misconduct, we would come in and take
the case.”121
However, California’s legislative branch had other ideas, princi-
pal among them was SB 227, proposed in early 2015. The same San
Francisco Chronicle article interviewing Attorney General Harris also
spoke to LaDoris Cordell, a former Santa Clara Judge who later served
as San Jose’s independent police auditor.122 In Cordell’s opinion,
“The decision about whether to prosecute police officers should be
taken away from prosecutors who work hand in hand, on a daily basis,
with police officers.”123 Cordell would become an important figure in
the legislative history of SB 227.
Senate Bill 227 proposed to add the following to California Penal
Code section 917:
[T]he grand jury shall not inquire into an offense that involves a
shooting or use of excessive force by a peace officer described in
Section 830.1, subdivision (a) of Section 830.2, or Section 830.39,
that led to the death of a person being detained or arrested by the
peace officer pursuant to Section 836.124
This new law would effectively remove any peace officer fatal
force case from the grand jury’s jurisdiction, allowing only charges by
the relevant government prosecutor (filing a criminal complaint) fol-
lowed by preliminary examination.
At the April 21, 2015 California Senate Public Safety Committee
meeting to consider SB 227, Judge Cordell’s ultimate question,
“Should grand juries be abolished?” was cited in the bill’s legislative
history.125 In reference to Eric Garner and Michael Brown, it con-
cluded, “[I]f we abolish criminal grand juries, at least their deaths will
not have been in vain.”126 The Committee’s report further explained
that the Legislators wanted more transparency in the system, which
had historically been closed to the public.127 They were upset that the
grand jury system was not adversarial—that there were no defense at-
torneys involved to cross examine or make objections.128 Another
complaint was that the judge was not present and only the prosecutor
121. Id. The article notes that the AG taking over a local case under such circumstances
had not happened since Harris took state office in 2011.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West 1996).
125. Senate Committee on Public Safety, Bill Analysis on SB 227, 4/21/2015, at 3–5.
126. Id. at 3–5.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 3.
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was allowed to explain the law.129 Indeed, the California State Confer-
ence of the NAACP noted in its support of the bill cited in the legisla-
tive history,
Ultimately, the convening of the grand juries in these cases has
provided no justice for the deaths of Eric Garner and Michael
Brown. . . . If [local prosecutors] do not choose to file charges
against the officers [in deadly force cases] they risk the disapproval
and criticism of the community. Conversely, if the local prosecutor
does decide to press charges, they jeopardize their relationship
with law enforcement and their unions. The option to proceed
with a criminal grand jury exonerates the prosecutor of their duties
and allows them to use the grand jury as a pawn for political
cover.130
Most importantly, California legislators that favored SB 227
wanted justice for Eric Garner and Michael Brown, as seen by this
theme’s repeated use in the April 21st Senate Public Safety analysis,
the May 5th Senate Floor analysis, the May 6th Senate Floor analysis,
and the June 15th Assembly Public Safety analysis.131 The Friends
Committee on Legislation of California is cited in the legislative his-
tory for the comment, “The failure to hold anyone accountable [in
the Garner and Brown cases] undermines public respect for the
law.”132 The longest argument in support of the bill came from Judge
Cordell’s editorial which not only called for the total abolishment of
the California indictment grand jury, but also argued why the prelimi-
nary examination method of charging (involving public hearings, de-
fense attorneys, and judges) is far superior.133
The California District Attorneys Association (“CDAA”) argued
against the bill, explaining to the legislators that California’s grand
jury system is fairer than any other, including the federal system.134
Penal Code section 939.6 further requires that all testimony must be
sworn, and only evidence that is admissible over objection in a crimi-
nal trial may be received in such formal investigations; thus, the rules
129. Id.
130. S.B. 277 Bill Analysis: Third Reading, LEGISLATIVE INFO CALIFORNIA (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_227_cfa_20150504_111
553_sen_floor.html [https://perma.cc/LT4B-DNW4].
131. Id.
132. S.B. 227 Bill Analysis: Assembly Committee on Public Safety, LEGISLATIVE INFO CALIFOR-
NIA (June 16, 2015), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_2
27_cfa_20150615_102234_asm_comm.html [https://perma.cc/5P34-NZ7X].
133. S.B. 227 Bill Analysis: Senate Committee on Public Safety, LEGISLATIVE INFO CALIFORNIA
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_227_
cfa_20150420_110925_sen_comm.html [https://perma.cc/GTU5-4DNY].
134. Grand Juries: Powers and Duties: Third Reading on S.B. 227 before S. Comm. On Public.
Safety 3 (Cal. 2015).
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of evidence are indeed used during grand jury investigations.135 Also,
prosecutors are required to present exculpatory evidence or suffer dis-
missal of the trial under Penal Code section 939.71.136 Additionally,
the CDAA explained that if an individual is indicted, the grand jury
investigation transcripts would be released to both the defense attor-
ney and the prosecutor, as well as the public under Penal Code sec-
tion 938.1.137 Moreover, the CDAA suggested that the Legislature
could modify section 938.1 of the Penal Code to include public re-
lease of the transcript for non-indicted peace officer fatal force cases,
so as to increase transparency without removing the cases from the
grand jury altogether.138 Notwithstanding the CDAA objections, SB
227 passed both houses of the California Legislature and was signed
by the Governor, Edmund J. Brown Jr., on August 11, 2015.139 It be-
came effective January 1, 2016.
III. Logical & Ethical Problems With This New Statutory
Grand Jury Band, and a Test Case Emerges
The reasoning behind the removal of peace officer fatal forces
cases from the grand jury’s purview may have been with the best inten-
tions, but it resulted in unintended and ironic consequences. Bring-
ing justice to those deserving may be harder now than it was before SB
227 because the grand jury has lost its power to hear these peace of-
ficer fatal force cases as a pre-charging investigative tool of the prosecu-
tion. Prosecutors are forced to directly file complaints on only the
strongest cases or internally decline to file.
The ethical rules of charging, as well as the timing of the two
major routes of felony charging mechanisms (indictment vs. com-
plaint/preliminary examination/information) must first be under-
stood. The minimum standard to file charges in the state of California
rests on the following four requirements:
[1] There has been a complete investigation and thorough consid-
eration of all pertinent data; [2] There is legally sufficient, admissi-
135. Grand Juries: Powers and Duties: Hearing on S.B. 227 before S. Comm. On Pub. Safety 5
(Cal. 2015) (quoting Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, No. 83-903,
67 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 58).
136. Senate Committee, supra note 125, at 4.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id.
139. S.B. 227 passed by a 23-12 vote in the Senate and a 41-33 vote in the Assembly. See
S.B. 227 Unofficial Ballot, LEGISLATIVE INFO CALIFORNIA (July 16, 2015), http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_227_vote_20150716_1012AM_asm_
floor.html [https://perma.cc/A7MX-SS5P].
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ble evidence of a corpus delicti; [3] There is legally sufficient,
admissible evidence of the accused’s identity as the perpetrator of
the crime; and [4]The prosecutor has considered the probability
of conviction by an objective factfinder hearing the admissible
evidence.140
In other words, for prosecutors to ethically file charges, they must
first believe they possess sufficient evidence to convict a defendant,
that being proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even California Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5-110 requires prosecutors not to file crim-
inal charges without a belief that such charges are supported by prob-
able cause.141 A preliminary examination, such as favored by Judge
Cordell and the California Legislature, is indeed a mechanism to test
probable cause, and the magistrate presiding must dismiss the com-
plaint if “it appears either that no public offense has been committed
or that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty of
a public offense.”142 A prosecutor may not simply file a criminal com-
plaint and conduct a preliminary examination hoping sufficient evi-
dence will be developed to possibly lead the magistrate to find
probable cause. A preliminary examination is not an investigatory
body the way a grand jury is; the simple chronological fact that a
grand jury is a pre-charging tool, while the preliminary examination is
post-charging, makes all the difference.
A case with strong evidence to establish that a peace officer shot
an unarmed, fleeing, traffic-stop suspect in the back, then attempted
to plant or hide evidence (as appears to have occurred in Charleston,
South Carolina in the independent witness’ cell phone video) is clear
enough to file directly by complaint and set for preliminary examina-
tion. While such cell phone videos are becoming more common, they
are still the exception. Because the weaker or more equivocal cases
cannot ethically be filed just to be tested at the preliminary examina-
tion, and can no longer be taken to the grand jury because of SB 227,
the net result of the new law may well be fewer peace officer fatal force
cases filed and more officers who use fatal force not facing public jus-
tice in court, contrary to apparent legislative intent. Moreover, with
these more equivocal cases being handled internally by district attor-
neys’ offices, leading them to decline to file charges with the issuance
140. The Ethics Comm. and Civil Liab. Principles for Prosecutors & Brian E. Michaels,
ed., Professionalism: A Sourcebook Of Ethics and Civil Liability Principles for Porsecutors, XXVII
PROSECUTOR’S NOTEBOOK III-18 (2001).
141. See RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.110 (STATE BAR OF CAL.) (“A member in govern-
ment service shall not institute or cause to be instituted charges when the member knows
or should know that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”).
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 871 (2016).
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merely of whatever report may be politically feasible in each jurisdic-
tion, the entire process thus becomes less, not more, transparent—the
exact opposite of what the Legislature wanted when enacting SB 227.
California prosecutors may have lost the battle in the Legislature,
now that SB 227 has passed and with Penal Code section 917(b) codi-
fied, but that result did not preclude them from testing the new law in
the courts once they found an appropriate test case. Just as SB 227 was
moving swiftly through the Legislature, a case was beginning in El Do-
rado County. Police received a call of a female screaming and crying
at an inn in South Lake Tahoe and dispatched two officers to re-
spond.143 Two minutes after arrival, one of the officers radioed that a
man was fleeing through an open window.144 Seconds later, the of-
ficer, Joshua Klinge, shot the man.145 That man, twenty-two-year-old
Kris Jackson, died in the hospital two hours later.146
Unable to independently charge the officer with any crimes due
to the lack of definitive evidence, but unwilling to simply sweep the
matter under the rug by internally closing the case, the El Dorado
District Attorney’s office, in early January 2016, subpoenaed Officer
Klinge and other peace officer witnesses to testify to a duly-empaneled
grand jury to further investigate the incident. Instead of obeying their
subpoenas and being compelled to testify, the officers, through their
union attorneys, filed a motion to quash the subpoena, citing the new
Penal Code section 917(b). The motion to quash argued to the Hon-
orable Superior Court Judge James R. Wagner that, because the grand
jury was no longer allowed to hear peace officer fatal force cases
under the new penal code legislation, the subpoena was improper and
should be quashed. The prosecution argued that the new statute was
unconstitutional on multiple grounds.147 The judge ultimately de-
clined to force the officers to testify on their accounts of the incident,
reluctantly ruling that he would not find the new law
unconstitutional.148
143. Bill Lindelof, Timeline of police shooting of unarmed man in South Lake Tahoe, SACRA-
MENTO BEE (July 17, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article2471
4634.html [https://perma.cc/ALX9-W3GN].
144. Id.
145. Id.; Isaac Brambila, Name of shooting officer in Jackson case released, TAHOE DAILY TRIB-
UNE (July 14, 2015), http://www.tahoedailytribune.com/news/17263684-113/name-of-
shooting-officer-in-jackson-case-released [https://perma.cc/AH2A-VE36].
146. Lindelof, supra note 143.
147. See infra Part IV.
148. A transcript of that hearing filed with the later appellate writ quotes Judge Wag-
ner, speaking to the prosecutor, “While I will say it was a very well put together argument,
and I’ll say a very cogent argument, and very—tempting is not the word—I can’t find the
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El Dorado County District Attorney then sought writ relief in the
third District Court of Appeals (“DCA”), claiming the new law was an
unconstitutional usurpation of the grand jury’s independent constitu-
tionally-created jurisdiction, as well as a legislative violation of the Ex-
ecutive’s power to choose between equal constitutional charging tools:
grand jury or preliminary examination.149 The CDAA, Riverside
County District Attorney, Sacramento County District Attorney, Yolo
County District Attorney, and Ventura County District Attorney filed
amicus briefs and letters in support of El Dorado County District At-
torney’s writ request. On April 22, 2016, the third DCA issued an or-
der to show cause, ordering respondents and real parties in interest
(“RPIs”), to show cause why petitioner El Dorado County District At-
torney’s request for relief should not be granted. RPI’s filed their re-
turn on May 23, 2016 and the issue was thus legally joined.150
IV. Legal Reasons Why SB 227 Is Unconstitutional, as
Presented in the El Dorado Test Case
A. Introduction
As of January 1, 2016, SB 227 enacted Penal Code section 917(b).
This change resulted in the removal of peace officer fatal force cases
from the jurisdiction of the criminal grand jury in California:
[T]he grand jury shall not inquire into an offense that involves a
shooting or use of excessive force by a peace officer described in
Section 830.1, subdivision (a) of Section 830.2, or Section 830.39,
that led to the death of a person being detained or arrested by the
peace officer pursuant to Section 836.151
The California Legislature has never before removed any class of
offenses from the criminal grand jury’s consideration. To be specific,
this is the first time in 166 years (since Statehood) that any type of
felony has been kept from the criminal grand jury’s ability to charge
through indictment, thereby restricting the District Attorney’s author-
ity to charge through complaint, preliminary examination, and infor-
mation only.
word I’m trying to find, but I would respectfully decline to declare this legislation unconsti-
tutional.” Motion to Compel Witness at 4, Grand Jury Investigation for El Dorado County
P16CRF0064, (2016), on file with author.
149. Petition for Writ of Mandate, California vs. Super. Ct. of El Dorado Cty., 7
Cal.App.5th 402 (2016) (No. P16CRF0064).
150. The Third DCA ordered the case set for oral argument in an unusual public fo-
rum, University of California, Davis, School of Law, on October 26, 2016. The DCA opin-
ion was issued on January 10, 2017, as this article was being edited; see infra Part VI.
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (1996).
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With origins in common law, the criminal grand jury and its in-
dictment power for felony crimes was written into the California Con-
stitution at the first Constitutional Convention in 1849; subsequently,
after the constitutional addition of the information in 1879, the in-
dictment remained as an alternative charging option. Before this addi-
tion, charging was performed solely through the criminal grand
jury.152 The criminal grand jury is constitutionally provided for, meaning
it was written into the Constitution. Thus, the power of the criminal
grand jury is specifically enacted by the Constitution. Such a constitu-
tional origin of power means that the only way to change or remove
the power given to the criminal grand jury by the Constitution is to
change the Constitution itself.153 The Constitution can only be
amended by a vote of the people, through either a ballot initiative,154
or the passage of legislation by a two-thirds vote in both houses to
place the issue on the ballot.155 Here, neither was done. Instead, the
Legislature itself amended the Penal Code in 2015 to take away the
power (over certain crimes) guaranteed to the criminal grand jury by
the state Constitution.
In addition to the protections afforded by the constitutional
amendment process, case law has proven that any changes made to
the criminal grand jury system by the legislature through processes
other than constitutional amendment must be procedural only, not
substantive.156 A procedural change is distinct from a substantive
change in that it does not affect the power of the criminal grand jury
to inquire into certain types of felonies. Thus, removing any felony—
in this case of SB 227, peace officer fatal force cases—is a substantive
change to the criminal grand jury system that is, in a word,
unconstitutional.
152. Indeed, the grand jury has existed as a formal institution for centuries. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 257 (1975) (Mosk concurring).
153. See, e.g., Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal. 2d 230, 241 (1936);
see also discussion infra Section IV.B.
154. CAL. CONST. art. II, §8.
155. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §1.
156. See discussion, infra Sections IV.B.3 and 4.
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B. The California Legislature Can Make Procedural but Not
Substantive Changes to the Criminal Grand Jury
1. The Criminal Grand Jury Originated in Common Law and Is
Constitutionally Recognized and Provided For
Prior to adopting the first California Constitution in 1849, the
criminal grand jury was a common law institution.157 Upon the adop-
tion of the Constitution of 1849, the criminal grand jury was first pro-
vided for: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other
infamous crime158 . . . unless on presentment or indictment of a grand
jury.”159 Because the criminal grand jury was rooted in common law,
“[t]he members of the first constitutional convention in providing for
a grand jury must have had in mind the grand jury as known to the
common law.”160
Then, the Constitution was amended at the last Constitutional
Convention of 1879 to add an alternative method for charging felo-
nies by information following preliminary examination: “The later
Constitution [of 1879] provided for the prosecution of criminal ac-
tions, either by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, or by indictment with or without examination.”161
The Convention of 1879, like the Convention of 1849, left all
questions affecting the grand jury not expressly covered by the Consti-
tution to the Legislature by failing to make further provisions as to the
grand jury. The Constitution of 1879 did not attempt to change the
historic character of the grand jury, and the system its members had
in mind was evidently the same system that had come down to them
from common law.162
Thus, the criminal grand jury retained its common law origin as
empowered by the Constitution.
2. Substantive Changes to the Criminal Grand Jury System Are
Unconstitutional Following Constitutional Recognition
The Court in Fitts further explained the above constitutional
change as limited in scope:
157. Fitts, 6 Cal.2d at 240.
158. “Infamous” crimes are felonies. In re Westenberg 167 Cal. 309, 319 (1914).
159. Fitts, 6 Cal. 2d at 240, citing CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I § 8 (now found in CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 241, CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I § 8 (now found in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14).
162. Id.
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Practically the only change made by the Constitution of 1879 was
to provide an additional system of prosecution for the higher grade
of crimes, when before all such crimes were to be prosecuted by
indictment of the grand jury. No change whatever was made in the
grand jury system as such. The Legislature was given no additional pow-
ers over the grand jury than those it had under the Constitution of
1849.163
This change gave the Executive—the District Attorney—an alter-
native method for charging felonies other than indictment by the
criminal grand jury: “[T]he prosecuting attorney is free in his com-
pletely unfettered discretion to choose which defendants will be
charged by indictment rather than information. . . .”164 Thus, the deci-
sion to use indictment or the new method of information was left to
the Executive.165
In addition to the change’s limit in scope, the Court in Fitts rea-
soned that because the constitutional conventions in both 1849 and
1879 did not mention anything more regarding how the criminal
grand jury system should operate, all further issues were left to the
Legislature, which the Constitution reads, “as prescribed by law.”166
This is where the substantive and procedural distinction originates—
the power of the criminal grand jury to charge was expressly provided
for by the Constitution, which is the substance of the criminal grand
jury. On the other hand, how this process was to take place was not
explained, except for its reliance upon the Legislature to prescribe.167
The power given to the Legislature was to regulate the criminal grand
jury’s procedure allowing it to function. Accordingly, Fitts concludes
that any criminal grand jury questions not expressly covered in the
Constitution are left to the Legislature, and because the power to
charge felonies by indictment is expressly stated, it is not left to the
Legislature to remove such power.168
Thus, the Legislature may make procedural changes to the crimi-
nal grand jury but may not make substantive changes, which are at issue
here: its ability to charge certain felonies. Such a “prescription by law”
that abrogates a power originating in the Constitution is thus
unconstitutional.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584, 594 (1978).
165. See also, People v. Carlton, 57 Cal. 559, 561–562 (1881).
166. Fitts, 6 Cal.2d at 241; CA CONST. art. 1, § 8.
167. People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632, 637 (1931).
168. Fitts, 6 Cal.2d at 241.
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3. emoving Any Felony From the Criminal Grand Jury Is a
Substantive Change and Thus Cannot Be Done Without
Constitutional Amendment
People v. Lensen determinined whether an indictment was valid
only when eleven male grand jurors returned a decision to indict
(eight female grand jurors voted to indict as well).169 Prior to Lensen,
only the male votes counted because the grand jury was defined as “a
body of men.”170 In 1917, just before the Lensen decision, the Legisla-
ture passed a statute that allowed women to be valid grand jurors.171
The court said, “The question has been removed from the field of
controversy by the recent statute” prescribing women as competent
grand jurors.172 Consequently, the Lensen court deferred to the Legis-
lature to answer the procedural questions of what the gender and
number of jurors should be in a grand jury.173
In People v. Bird, the prosecutor filed an information charging the
defendant for murder, but the magistrate held that the defendant
should only be held to answer for manslaughter.174 Thus the court
considered whether the prosecutor could file an information for a dif-
ferent charge from the one which the defendant was held to an-
swer.175 In doing so, the court discussed the Legislature’s power
provided by the Constitution:
There is nothing in the constitutional section which would compel
or authorize a contrary conclusion, and there would appear to be
every reason why the Legislature should be free to provide procedure
consistent with constitutional requirements applicable both to in-
dictment and information. With or without these words, the consti-
tutional section is not self-executing as to the procedure to be followed
by either method in bringing the accused to trial.176
The procedure discussed in Bird was the use of either an indictment
or information to bring an accused to trial. Thus, the Legislature had
the right to regulate how indictments and informations were brought
and handled, but could not regulate the underlying substance of those
indictments and informations because that was the very power to in-
vestigate felony charges by the grand jury and the prosecution.177
169. People v. Lensen, 34 Cal.App. 336 (3d Dist. 1917).
170. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 339–40.
172. Id. at 340.
173. Id.
174. Bird, 212 Cal. at 632.
175. Id. at 638–9.
176. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
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Both courts in Lensen and Bird, respectively, concluded that a pro-
cedural change was limited to the process of the criminal grand jury in
its indictment role and the process of the Executive in his charging of
a defendant by information. Apart from the process are the criminal
grand jury’s rights and duties, which are the substance. These rights
and duties include the ability to investigate and charge felonies (ex-
pressly given in the constitution); the procedure may be the steps taken
to get there, but the substance is the act of investigating and charging.
Penal Code section 917(b)’s removal of felony charging by the
criminal grand jury for a particular type of case is not a procedural
change—it is a substantive change. Because the ability to charge felo-
nies is the core right and duty of the criminal grand jury, removing
the ability to charge any felony results in changing the substance of
what the grand jury does. As of 2016 in California, there is no ques-
tion of procedure or how to charge a peace officer fatal force case by
indictment because it has been completely removed from the indict-
ment option.
Because the Legislature had no substantive regulatory powers
concerning the criminal grand jury, and removing the duty of charg-
ing peace officer fatal force cases from the criminal grand jury is a
substantive change and not procedural, the Legislature does not have
the authority to make this change.178
4. More Recent Cases Have Continued to Hold That the
Legislature Is Involved Only With Grand Jury Procedure
In Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court of Orange County, the court
considered whether the superior court had the inherent authority to
order the release of criminal grand jury materials after the investiga-
tion was finished, and no indictments were returned (or asked for),
when no statute provided for such release.179 The court mainly dis-
cussed grand jury secrecy law and practice, but also noted other points
that are relevant to the issue herein. The court discussed, “[a]lthough
the grand jury was originally derived from the common law, the Cali-
fornia Legislature has codified extensive rules defining it and gov-
178. Lensen and Bird do speak to procedure, but neither expressly hold that the Legisla-
ture may not regulate substance. That rule comes, only impliedly, from Fitts, where it says
the Legislature can provide for the grand jury for all questions “not expressly covered by
the constitution.” Since the Constitution expressly provides the grand jury may indict felo-
nies, it follows that taking such core indictment power away, even for only a class of of-
fenses, abrogates the grand jury’s basic constitutional power.
179. Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court, 20  Cal.4th 1117 (1999).
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erning its formation and proceedings, including provisions for
implementing the long-established tradition of grand jury secrecy.”180
The court cited Fitts and then noted that “[t]he California Consti-
tution, as adopted in 1879, left to the Legislature the adoption of spe-
cific rules for the operation of the grand jury.”181
Neither the grand jury nor the court has the “intrinsic” or “inher-
ent” power to disclose grand jury testimony—this simply cannot be
done unless authorized by the Legislature.182 The court also recog-
nized the significance that “no California case over the last century
since the California grand jury was constitutionally established has permit-
ted transcripts of testimony before a criminal grand jury to be dis-
closed based only on a court’s inherent or its supervisory role over the
grand jury.”183
In Daily Journal Corp., the lower court had no inherent authority
to release grand jury materials where no indictment had been re-
turned and no statute authorized this.184 Likewise, the grand jury itself
could not do this because, by common law, such material was se-
cret.185 Since grand jury procedural law is no longer changed by com-
mon law, but instead by the Legislature, this grand jury material could
not be released, unless this had been statutorily authorized—which it
had not.186
The issue in People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County
(Mouchaourab) was whether an indicted defendant was entitled to pro-
duction of the nontestimonial parts of a grand jury proceeding for the
purpose of preparing a Penal Code section 995 motion.187 The court
discussed grand jury secrecy at length, and provided some insight into
early California grand jury law in this regard:
The secret grand jury has been a part of California’s criminal jus-
tice system since its beginning. In 1849, the first California Consti-
tution provided that no person would be held to answer for a
180. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). The court also discussed that the Legislature had
codified the common-law rule of grand jury secrecy, and had provided some statutory ex-
ceptions to it. Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th at 1125 (discussing People
v. Tinder 19 Cal. 539, 545 (1862)).
182. Daily Journal, 20 Cal.4th at 1128.
183. Id. at 1130 (emphasis omitted and added).
184. Id. at 1120.
185. Id. at 1128.
186. Id. at 1129–1130.
187. People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (Mouchaourab), 78 Cal.App.4th
403 (6th Dist. 2000). A Penal Code section 995 motion is made by the defense to challenge
the sufficiency of an indictment or information on various legal grounds.
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capital or infamous crime “unless of presentment or indictment of
a grand jury.” The common law requirement of secrecy in grand jury pro-
ceedings was first codified in 1851 in the Criminal Practice Act (hereafter,
the Act), and was maintained when California enacted its first Penal Code
in 1872 . . . Although the grand jury was originally derived from the
common law, the California Legislature had codified extensive
rules defining it and governing its formation and proceedings, includ-
ing provisions for implementing the long-established tradition of
grand jury secrecy . . . .188
Finally, when analyzing SB 227 in terms of legislative overreach-
ing beyond mere procedure, one should also examine Mendoza v.
State.189 Mendoza notes that the Legislature may exercise “any and all
legislative powers which are not expressly or by necessary implication
denied to it by the Constitution,”190 and any “doubt should be re-
solved in favor of the Legislature’s action.”191 However, looking be-
yond these standard rules of statutory construction is quite instructive.
Mendoza was a mandamus action brought by the Los Angeles Unified
School District against the State of California, when the Legislature
passed a statute (“the Romero Act”) to transfer control of the school
district to the Los Angeles mayor.192 After duly noting the above pre-
sumptions of constitutionality and rules of statutory construction, the
court exercised its ultimate authority as arbiter of the constitutionality
of statutes to find the Romero Act unconstitutional on multiple
grounds, and affirmed the trial court’s order granting the school dis-
trict’s writ.193 Its discussion of legislative overreaching therein is eerily
prescient to the current situation:
This is nothing more than an end-run around the Constitution. If
article IX, section 16 [of the California Constitution] is to mean
anything, it must mean that charter cities can not only choose the
composition of their boards of education, but that charter cities
are guaranteed freedom from legislative interference even when
the Legislature is of the opinion that they have made the wrong
choice.194
In the El Dorado test case, if Article I, section 14 (formerly sec-
tion 8),195 allowing criminal offenses to be prosecuted by information
or indictment, is to mean anything, it must mean that grand juries
188. Id. at 414 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 8; and Daily
Journal, 20 Cal.4th at 1122).
189. Mendoza v. State, 149 Cal.App.4th 1034 (2007).
190. Id. at 1050–51.
191. Id. at 1051.
192. Id. at 1040.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1053.
195. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 14 (formerly CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 8).
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and prosecutors in choosing to inquire and indict any and all felonies
are shielded from legislative interference even when the Legislature is
of the opinion that they have made the wrong choice.
C. Penal Code Section 917(b) is Unconstitutional as Legislative
Overreaching Upon the Powers of Each of the Other
Branches of Government, in Violation of the
Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. The New Law Impairs the Court’s Exercise of its Constitutional
Power and Fulfillment of its Constitutional Function (to
the Extent the Grand Jury Is Considered an Arm
of the Court)
The indictment grand jury is a hybrid institution of constitutional
origin, empaneled by the Court196 but empowered to conduct inquir-
ies and return charges as part of the Executive.197 To the extent the
indictment grand jury is an arm of the court, cases prohibiting legisla-
tive enactments that diminish the jurisdiction of the court directly ap-
ply. Even considering only the grand jury’s hybrid capacity, such case
law preventing the Legislature from disturbing the constitutional juris-
diction and powers of a separate branch of government are still closely
analogous and helpful.
California cases have long recognized that “the Legislature gener-
ally may adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court’s inherent
powers or functions, so long as the legislation does not ‘defeat’ or
‘materially impair’ a court’s exercise of its constitutional power or the
fulfillment of its constitutional function.”198 In Selby v. Oakdale Irriga-
196. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 895; 896; 904; 914 (West 2016).
197. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 923; 934; 935; 939 (West 2016).
198. Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal.4th 45, 58–59 (1996); see also,
Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.3d 182, 191–92 (1977) (“[T]he constitutional jurisdic-
tion and powers of the superior court . . . can in no ways be trenched upon, lessened or
limited by the legislature.”). Accordingly, a 1923 California Supreme Court case affirming
a District Attorney’s bringing of a nuisance abatement action and injunction against Eu-
reka establishments violating Prohibition:
the jurisdiction to abate a nuisance is not derived from the state statute but from
the constitution. This jurisdiction, we held in the case of Carse v. Marsh, supra,
[189 Cal. 743] was vested in the superior court without any state legislation
whatever. Such jurisdiction being thus vested by the constitution itself, could not
be taken away even by an express statutory provision attempting so to do.
In re Brambini, 192 Cal. 19, 39 (1923). See also, Coldthirst v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 49
Cal.App. 525, 527 (1920) (“Manifestly, the legislature itself could not change the jurisdic-
tion that has been conferred upon the various courts by the constitution, although it may
regulate the mode or manner in which the jurisdiction of a court may be invoked or
challenged.”).
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tion District, the petitioner sought mandate in the courts to compel the
irrigation district to pay the interest on its matured bonds that peti-
tioner owned.199 Respondent Oakdale Irrigation District attempted to
defend its action by citing a 1933 legislative amendment to the Cali-
fornia Irrigation District Act (section 113), which purported to “limit
the right of anyone to bring [such] a proceeding [ ] against the board
of directors of an irrigation district unless the holders of ten percent
or more of the duly issued outstanding and unpaid bonds of the dis-
trict joined in such an action.”200 The Third District Court of Appeal
quickly brushed aside Respondent’s defense:
As to the right of the parties to prosecute this action we agree with
counsel that section 113 [ ], added to the California Irrigation Dis-
trict Act by an act of the legislature approved May 9, 1933, is inef-
fective for any purpose. Its unconstitutionality is so apparent that
citation of authority seems needless. . . . It is evident that the legis-
lature has no power to limit the right of anyone whose property
interests have been invaded, to seek redress through the courts un-
less joined by others owning like property.201
In the case of SB 227, the Legislature’s unprecedented act of de-
nying grand jury jurisdiction to an entire class of cases is equally “inef-
fective for any purpose” and its unconstitutionality “so apparent.”202
To prevent the Executive from using a constitutionally-established
arm of the court, the grand jury, and indeed to prevent the grand jury
itself to perform its constitutional function of considering and voting
on indictments with prosecution guidance, on an entire class of cases,
is beyond Legislative power.203
The facts and ruling in United States v. R. Enterprises204 is starkly
analogous to the situation in the El Dorado test case, both in regard to
litigant efforts to quash grand jury subpoenas and the broad power of
the grand jury itself. In R. Enterprises, a federal grand jury in Virginia
investigating interstate transportation of obscene materials issued sub-
poenas for corporate books, records, and videotapes from defendant
companies (all owned by one man).205 The companies moved to
quash the subpoenas and, when the District Court denied the motion
to quash and defendants still refused to comply, the District Court
199. Shelby v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 140 Cal.App. 171 (3d Dist. 1934).
200. Id. at 177.
201. Id. at 176–77.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
205. Id. at 293.
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held defendant in contempt.206 The United States Supreme Court
held that the District Court properly refused to quash the subpoe-
nas.207 In so holding, it noted the expansive role of a grand jury in-
quiry in American jurisprudence:
The grand jury occupies a unique role in our criminal justice sys-
tem. It is an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of
determining whether or not a crime has been committed. Unlike
this Court, whose jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or
controversy, the grand jury “can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assur-
ance that it is not.”. . . The function of the grand jury is to inquire
into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation
until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has
occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function,
the grand jury paints with a broad brush. “A grand jury investiga-
tion ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run
down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a
crime has been committed.’”208
Similarly, in California appellate case M.B. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, a Los Angeles criminal grand jury investigating allegations of
molestation by priests issued subpoenas duces tecum for documents,
including personnel files, in the hands of the Archdiocese.209 The
trial court denied the priests’ motions to quash the subpoenas, and
the Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed, holding that the
grand jury may, based on both common law and statute, issue such
subpoenas.210 In its discussion, the court observed:
[The grand jury] is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investi-
gation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be
limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the prob-
able result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular
individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the pre-
cise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed
at the conclusion of the grand jury’s labors, not at the
beginning.211
In enacting Penal Code section 917(b), the California Legislature
stripped the grand jury’s power of inquisition over a critically impor-
tant class of felony acts affecting our communities by not allowing this
206. Id. at 295.
207. Id. at 296–97.
208. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (quoting United States v. Stone, 429
F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970)) (internal citation omitted).
209. M.B. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.App.4th 1384 (2d Dist. 2002).
210. Id. at 1396.
211. Id. at 1394–95 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13 n. 12 (1973)).
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constitutional and historically ancient body of selected citizens to even
begin their labors, let alone conclude them.
2. The New Law Violates Separation of Powers by Impairing the
Constitutional Right of the Executive to Prosecute Cases
Using Constitutional Choices Within its
Prosecutorial Discretion
It cannot be disputed that the Executive can constitutionally
choose which charging method to employ. Cases are replete in this
regard.212
By enacting Penal Code section 917(b), the Legislature at-
tempted to tie the hands of a separate and equal branch of govern-
ment, the Executive, in utilizing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, a core function of its job. The Legislature may believe that
the prosecution still maintains discretion to investigate peace officer
fatal force cases themselves and, if ethically appropriate, to file crimi-
nal charges by way of complaint, preliminary examination, and infor-
mation. However, for the 166 years since Statehood, California
prosecutors have had the choice to proceed on felonies by way of in-
dictment (indeed until 1879, indictment was the only choice). As of
January 1, 2016, that choice was legislatively removed, and the stat-
ute213 that did so is unconstitutional.
3. SB 227’s Newly-Enacted Sections 918 and 919 Do Not Save the
Statute From Unconstitutionally Impinging on the Grand
Jury’s Substantive Jurisdiction
Penal Code section 917(a) remains unchanged in affecting the
grand jury’s constitutionally-established power to inquire into public
212. See, e.g., People v. Carlton  57 Cal. 559, 561–562 (1881) (“[I]t is left to the discre-
tion of the district attorney to prosecute either by indictment or information. . . .”); People
v. Goodspeed, 22 Cal.App.3d 690, 704 (4th Dist. 1972) (emphasis added) (“[T]he courts of
this state have held the Constitution and statutes of California authorizing a prosecutor to
proceed against an accused either by indictment or information, at his option, are constitu-
tional.”); Hawkins, 22 Cal.3d 584, 592 (“[T]he prosecuting attorney is free in his com-
pletely unfettered discretion to choose which defendants will be charged by indictment
rather than information . . . .”); People v. Schlosser,  77 Cal.App. 3d 1007, 1010 (3d Dist.
1978) (“[I]t is clear from the decisions that a district attorney is free to use either of the
two vehicles to bring a defendant to trial.”); Bowens v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
1 Cal.4th 36, 54 (1991) (Mosk, J. dissenting) (“[T]he People may prosecute all defendants
by indictment; or they may prosecute all by information; or they may choose to prosecute
some by indictment and some by information False.”); People v. Carrington 47 Cal.4th 145,
180–81 (2009) (“[I]n the prosecution of a felony, the People may proceed ‘either by in-
dictment or by information (CAL. CONST., art. I, §14).’”).
213. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917(b).
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offenses triable within the county, and to present them to the court
for indictment. It is the new section 917(b)214 which excepts the class
of cases involving peace officer fatal force from grand jury inquiry, but
exempts section 918215 from that ban. Section 918 concerns the curi-
ous, and largely historically vestigial matter of grand jury presentments,
charging documents initiated by the grand jury on their own, without
involvement by the prosecution. This presentment authority of the
grand jury was already in disuse in 1895.216 Presentments were largely
repealed in 1905.217
Some may claim that changes to Penal Code section 919218 also
saved the grand jury’s constitutional power to investigate peace officer
fatal force cases. However, that claim misreads the statutory changes,
which, under careful scrutiny, fall back upon the same disused and
vestigial section 918. Section 919 authorizes grand jury inquiry into
prisons and corrupt misconduct in office. Subsection (c) was expressly
amended by SB 227 to disallow such grand jury inquiries into peace
officer fatal force cases involving detained persons. Again, as with sec-
tion 917, an exception to this area of disallowed inquiry was made by
express reference to section 918. Any road leading back to section 918
is a legal dead end. The grand jury may not legally investigate crimes
without conducting a formal inquiry that may lead to an indictment,
as allowed in the initial section 917. Any Legislative mentions of sec-
tion 918’s outmoded presentment authority should effectively be con-
sidered legal nullities.
However, anyone who understands (or strives to understand)
grand jury actual practice can ascertain fatally significant practical
problems with any current use of the grand jury’s presentment au-
thority, without assistance of “the prosecuting officer to attend the
214. “Except as provided in Section 918, the grand jury shall not inquire into an of-
fense that involves a shooting or use of excessive force by a peace offer . . . that led to the
death of a person being detained or arrested by the peace officer . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 917(b).
215. “If a member of a grand jury knows, or has reason to believe, that a public offense,
triable within the county, has been committed, he may declare it to his fellow jurors, who
may thereupon investigate it.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 918.
216. In Re Grosbois, 109 Cal. 445, 448 (1895).
217. See Fitts, 6 Cal.2d at 235.
218. The grand jury shall inquire into the willful or corrupt misconduct in office
of public officers of every description within the county. Except as provided in
Section 918, this subdivision does not apply to misconduct that involves a shoot-
ing or use of excessive force by a peace officer . . . that led to the death of a
person being detained or arrested by the peace officer . . . .
CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(c).
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grand jury and advise them in their investigation.”219 El Dorado
County, like many smaller counties in California,220 does not maintain
a standing criminal or indictment grand jury.221 These jurisdictions
have their prosecutors call upon their courts to empanel an indict-
ment grand jury to hear a specific case or anticipated group of cases
within a particular time period, up to a year, but are often discharged
earlier.222 If there is no currently operating indictment grand jury in
such counties as in the El Dorado test case, how can the Legislature’s
saving grace section 918 ever be triggered, as there would be no
“member of a grand jury” to know of a public offense in order to
“declare it to his fellow jurors, who may thereupon investigate it”?223
Some larger counties maintain a standing indictment grand jury for
various periods of time up to a year.224 Such standing grand juries
could at least begin a section 918 investigation on their own, but that
investigation would surely die on the vine, given the following practi-
cal issues:
Who would call the standing indictment grand jury to session to
investigate?
Who would subpoena potential witnesses, by what process, and
with what agency for service of process, since the grand jury has long
been disallowed from hiring persons to investigate crime?225
Who among the lay jurors would respond to any witness motions
to quash their subpoenas (the precise legal maneuver that occurred in
El Dorado), or argue the merits of their opposition in court (since the
District Attorney is not allowed under the Legislature’s scenario)? And
at county expense?
Under section 918, there is no indictment; without an indict-
ment, there can be no transcript of proceedings under current law.226
So to whom can this section 918 grand jury investigation be referred,
219. Grosbois, 109 Cal. at 448.
220. E.g., Sonoma, San Mateo, Santa Barbara.
221. Penal Code § 904.6 allows for an indictment grand jury in every county, in addi-
tion to the normal civil or watchdog grand jury. It was enacted in 2006 to correct the
challenge of the civil grand jury (often appointed with volunteers or citizens simply known
to that County’s judges) issuing indictments that violate the federal constitutional mandate
of fair-cross section representation in jury selection. CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6 (2016); see
also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
222. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(c) (2016).
223. See infra Part III.
224. E.g., Los Angeles, San Francisco (4 month term), San Diego (one month term).
225. See Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal.2d 607, 608 (1934).
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1(a) (2016).
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and in what form, without violating the core principal of grand jury
secrecy?
V. Conclusion
Transparency in prosecution charging decisions is laudable, and
potential criminal overreaching by the very peace officers charged to
keep the peace should be fully, fairly, and ethically examined. How-
ever, SB 227 was poorly conceived, suffers from unintended conse-
quences, and cannot be saved by a vestigial presentment law with no
legal or practical effect. While the policy merits of such legislation
failed to move our state Legislature, the true fatal flaw in SB 227 is its
unconstitutionality, its legislative overreaching. The Legislature may
not approve of the grand jury hearing these, or indeed, any cases, as
the history of SB 227 makes clear. Yet, the Legislature also does not
have the power to take away constitutionally-conferred jurisdiction
over cases; it does not have the power to subvert an equal branch of
government’s charging decision and its manner of exercising its core
discretion to file charges. SB 227 enacted Penal Code section 917(b),
which should not stand. It will be up to the appellate court to grant El
Dorado District Attorney’s Writ to declare this statute unconstitutional
and compel the Respondent Superior Court to reverse its earlier or-
der quashing grand jury subpoenas in the Kris Jackson case. That case
deserves its day in the constitutional forum of the local prosecutor’s
choosing, just as California prosecutors have been so choosing since
statehood. The final chapter of peace officer fatal force cases in Cali-
fornia has yet to be written.
VI. Epilogue
On January 10, 2017, the Third District Court of Appeal issued
and certified for publication its unanimous opinion in The People v. the
Superior Court of El Dorado County, written by Acting Presiding Justice
Butz and signed by Justices Mauro and Murray.227 As discussed ear-
lier,228 Petitioner, the El Dorado District Attorney, argued primarily
that the Legislature’s SB 227 was an unconstitutional removal of the
substantive jurisdiction and power of the California grand jury, a body
established by the state Constitution. Petitioner argued, as noted
above,229 that this statute was the first such restriction on the grand
227. People v. Super. Ct. of El Dorado Cty., 7 Cal.App.5th 402, 406 (3d Dist. 2017).
228. See supra Part IV.
229. See supra section IV.B.
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jury’s indictment charging powers since statehood.230 Petitioner fur-
ther argued that the Legislature violated the principle of the separa-
tion of powers. Finally, Petitioners noted that California Penal Code
section 918’s presentment statute cannot protect SB 227’s limitation
to section 917, because that presentment authority is both legally out-
moded and practically ineffective. The Appellate Court accepted every
one of these arguments, granting Petitioner’s relief, which ordered the El
Dorado Superior Court to vacate its orders quashing the prosecution
subpoenas and dismissing the grand jury, and which unequivocally de-
clared SB 227 to be unconstitutional.
The appellate opinion’s primary holding states:231
Having now delivered this lecture on grand jury procedure, we
must confront the sui generis nature of section 917, the first legisla-
tive effort in 167 years to constrict the grand jury’s power under
the Constitution to exercise its power of indictment. . . . [W]e can-
not reach a conclusion other than to find that the Legislature does
not have the power to enact a statute that limits the constitutional
power of a criminal grand jury to indict any adult accused of a
criminal offense. To allow the Legislature to restrict this constitu-
tional role in part would be to concede the power to restrict it in its
entirety, a position that has never been endorsed in any precedent
in the entire history of our jurisprudence, and which was specifi-
cally withheld from the Legislature in the enactment of the Consti-
tution of 1879. We therefore must find that the amendments to section 917
are unconstitutional on this basis.232
The opinion’s lengthy discussion of California grand jury history
emphasized that this institution, originally based in common law, had
become a body created by Constitution (both in 1849 and in 1879).233
The appellate court then emphasized that the Legislature was granted
plenary authority over “all questions affecting the grand jury not ex-
pressly covered by the Constitution.”234 California constitutional history,
providing for the availability of both indictment and information as
charging tools at the choice of the prosecution, establishes that the
Legislature does not have the power to eliminate one such choice.235
Moreover, despite RPI assertions to the contrary, the Legislature’s ac-
tion on Penal Code section 917 was not a simple procedural matter
230. See supra Part IV.
231. El Dorado Cty., 7 Cal.App.5th at 406 (3d Dist. 2017).
232. Id. at 413. (citing Fitts v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 230, the primary case relied
upon by Petitioner) (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 411–12.
234. Id. at 411 (citing Fitts v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles Country, 6 Cal.2d
230 (1936).
235. Id. (citing People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632, 637 (1936)).
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within its powers, because “the effect of this procedural change is none-
theless an unconstitutional restriction on the express provision for the
grand jury’s ability to indict adults.”236
Having declared the amended section 917 unconstitutional, the
appellate court did not need to consider the petitioner’s alternative
argument that the statute violated the separation of powers principle
by limiting the executive’s charging authority. However, the opinion
reinforced the unconstitutional impact of the Legislature’s action by
articulating a very close analogy to the concept of separation of pow-
ers. The appellate court’s historical analysis stated that the criminal
grand jury is not part of the three branches of government, but,
rather, “a constitutional fixture in its own right that does not belong to
any branch and ‘serv[es] as a kind of buffer or referee between the
Government and the people.”237 Therefore, while the separation of
powers doctrine does not strictly apply to a constitutional body
outside the three-part form of our government, the concept is the
same: the Legislature simply “cannot act to defeat or materially impair
the inherent constitutional power of another entity.”238
The appellate court rejected the proffered section 918 present-
ment statute defense. Calling the presentment “a dead letter of crimi-
nal procedure,”239 the justices detailed the “significant practical
difficulties”240 of grand jury self-investigations when a grand jury may
not even be convened at the time, would have to obtain and examine
witnesses without prosecution assistance, and would be unable to gain
the assistance of any investigators. All such points were raised by peti-
tioners as well as the authors herein.241
Finally, the appellate opinion began and ended in a discussion of
the Legislature’s stated goal for SB 227, to achive greater transparency in
peace officer fatal force cases. Noting such a goal to be salutary, the appel-
late court, in dicta, declared this statutory means to that end to in-
trude on “the constitutional grant of authority to the criminal grand
jury to issue an indictment after inquiry, which taken to its logical
236. Id. at 414 (emphasis in original).
237. Id. at 408 n.5 (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992)) (empha-
sis in original)).
238. Id. at 414 (citing Steen v. Appellate Div. Super. Ct., 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1053 (Cal.
2013)).  It is worth noting that the Third District Court of Appeal, at footnote 10, similarly
cited to the analogous situation in Mendoza v. State of California, 149 Cal.App.4th 1034
(2007). See El Dorado Cty., C081603 2017 WL 83809 at 5 n. 10. For a discussion on Men-
doza, which was also cited by Petitioner, see supra Part IV.B.4.
239. El Dorado Cty., 7 Cal.App.5th at 409.
240. Id. at 414.
241. See supra Section IV.C.3.
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conclusion would allow the Legislature by statute to abrogate indict-
ments entirely for all classes of offenses.”242 The opinion, in dicta,
noted that the Legislature could seek a constitutional amendment to
accomplish the end it sought by statute in modifying section 917 to
disallow peace officer fatal force cases being indicted by grand juries.
Alternatively, it suggested a less cumbersome fix of reforming the (ar-
guably) purely procedural rules of grand jury secrecy in such cases—a
point made by both petitioner in its briefs and in oral argument.243
A prosecutor’s duty, as part of the executive branch, is neither to
make nor interpret our laws, but to enforce them. However, it is cer-
tainly within the duties of an ethical prosecutor to seek legal venues to
test laws when they appear to be unconstitutional. That was done, so
far successfully, in this situation, restoring to the venerable institution
of the grand jury its rightful power to indict all felony crimes in Cali-
fornia. Still, the final chapter of peace officer fatal force cases in Cali-
fornia remains unwritten:244 The California Supreme Court has yet to
weigh in on this statute, and there may be more legal challenges
outside the Third District. One final observation is worth mentioning:
Ethical prosecutors must base their prosecutions, before the grand
jury or any legal forum, upon fact, not upon assumption or antipathy.
They must also follow the rules of law and the state Constitution. It
behooves our state Legislators to observe the same behaviors in their
crafting of our state laws.
242. El Dorado Cty., 7 Cal.App.5th at 406. This is likely an acknowledgement of the
legislative history cited, which suggests a future abolishment of the criminal grand jury
entirely not just in this limited class of cases. For a discussion on the legislative history, see
supra Section II.B.
243. For a discussion on this point, see supra Section II.B.
244. See supra Part V.
